Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
FIRST NATIONWIDE BANK, Appellant,
v.
Amarante PRETEL, a/k/a Amaranto DePretel, et al., Respondents.
June 23, 1997.
 Bank brought foreclosure action against mortgagor and related parties.   The 
Supreme Court, Queens County, Golar, J., entered summary judgment dismissing 
complaint as abandoned. Bank appealed.   The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
held that settlement negotiations justified delay in request for default 
judgment.
 Reversed, and complaint reinstated.
West Headnotes
[1] Judgment  123(2)
228k123(2) Most Cited Cases
Where plaintiff fails to seek leave to enter default judgment within one year 
after default, he or she must offer reasonable excuse for delay and demonstrate 
that complaint is meritorious.  McKinney's CPLR 3215(c).
[2] Judgment  119
228k119 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 266k486)
Bank was entitled to default judgment of foreclosure, though bank did not seek 
leave to enter default judgment within one year of default, where record 
contained absolutely no evidence to dispute bank's claim that mortgagor 
defaulted on mortgage more than ten years earlier, parties were engaged in 
settlement discussions in meantime, and there was no indication in the record 
that mortgagor or related parties were in any way prejudiced by bank's delay. 
McKinney's CPLR 3215(c).
 **291 Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Samuel Kirschenbaum and 
Bernadette M. Arnotto, of counsel), for appellant.
 Before RITTER, J.P., and SULLIVAN, ALTMAN and McGINITY, JJ.
 MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
 *629 In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by 
its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golar, 
J.), dated June 21, 1996, as, upon its motion for summary judgment, dismissed 
the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Amarante Pretel, First 
American Title Insurance Company of New York, Mela Alio, and "John" Alio, as 
abandoned, as the plaintiff had failed to seek leave to enter a timely default 
judgment against them.
 ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with 
costs, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as it is asserted against 
Amarante Pretel, **292 First American Title Insurance Company of New York, Mela 
Alio, and "John" Alio.
 [1][2] Where a plaintiff fails to seek leave to enter a default judgment within 
one year after the default (CPLR 3215[c] ), he or she must offer a reasonable 
excuse for the delay and demonstrate that the complaint is meritorious (see, 
Manago v. Giorlando, 143 A.D.2d 646, 533 N.Y.S.2d 106). The plaintiff has met 
the standard in this case.   The record contains absolutely no evidence to 
dispute the plaintiff's claim that the defendant, Amarante Pretel, defaulted on 
the mortgage in February 1986.   Further, the existence of settlement 
discussions with Pretel constituted a reasonable excuse for the plaintiff's 
failure to seek leave to enter a judgment (see, Katz v. Knoesel Serv. Center, 
117 A.D.2d 781, 499 N.Y.S.2d 107).   Finally, there is no indication in the 
record that the defendants were in any way prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay 
(see, Katz v. Knoesel Serv. Center, supra).
659 N.Y.S.2d 291, 240 A.D.2d 629
END OF DOCUMENT
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
FIRST NATIONWIDE BANK, Appellant,v.Amarante PRETEL, a/k/a Amaranto DePretel, et al., Respondents.

June 23, 1997.

 Bank brought foreclosure action against mortgagor and related parties.   The Supreme Court, Queens County, Golar, J., entered summary judgment dismissing complaint as abandoned. Bank appealed.   The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that settlement negotiations justified delay in request for default judgment.
 Reversed, and complaint reinstated.

West Headnotes
[1] Judgment  123(2)228k123(2) Most Cited Cases
Where plaintiff fails to seek leave to enter default judgment within one year after default, he or she must offer reasonable excuse for delay and demonstrate that complaint is meritorious.  McKinney's CPLR 3215(c).
[2] Judgment  119228k119 Most Cited Cases (Formerly 266k486)
Bank was entitled to default judgment of foreclosure, though bank did not seek leave to enter default judgment within one year of default, where record contained absolutely no evidence to dispute bank's claim that mortgagor defaulted on mortgage more than ten years earlier, parties were engaged in settlement discussions in meantime, and there was no indication in the record that mortgagor or related parties were in any way prejudiced by bank's delay. McKinney's CPLR 3215(c). **291 Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., Garden City (Samuel Kirschenbaum and Bernadette M. Arnotto, of counsel), for appellant.

 Before RITTER, J.P., and SULLIVAN, ALTMAN and McGINITY, JJ.


 MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
 *629 In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golar, J.), dated June 21, 1996, as, upon its motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Amarante Pretel, First American Title Insurance Company of New York, Mela Alio, and "John" Alio, as abandoned, as the plaintiff had failed to seek leave to enter a timely default judgment against them.
 ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as it is asserted against Amarante Pretel, **292 First American Title Insurance Company of New York, Mela Alio, and "John" Alio.
 [1][2] Where a plaintiff fails to seek leave to enter a default judgment within one year after the default (CPLR 3215[c] ), he or she must offer a reasonable excuse for the delay and demonstrate that the complaint is meritorious (see, Manago v. Giorlando, 143 A.D.2d 646, 533 N.Y.S.2d 106). The plaintiff has met the standard in this case.   The record contains absolutely no evidence to dispute the plaintiff's claim that the defendant, Amarante Pretel, defaulted on the mortgage in February 1986.   Further, the existence of settlement discussions with Pretel constituted a reasonable excuse for the plaintiff's failure to seek leave to enter a judgment (see, Katz v. Knoesel Serv. Center, 117 A.D.2d 781, 499 N.Y.S.2d 107).   Finally, there is no indication in the record that the defendants were in any way prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay (see, Katz v. Knoesel Serv. Center, supra).
659 N.Y.S.2d 291, 240 A.D.2d 629
END OF DOCUMENT