Consumer action against ADT dismissed on shorten notice contract provision September 19, 2026

KEN KIRSCHENBAUM, ESQ
ALARM - SECURITY INDUSTRY LEGAL EMAIL NEWSLETTER / THE ALARM EXCHANGE
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Consumer action against ADT dismissed on shorten notice contract provision
September 19, 2026
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Consumer action against ADT dismissed on shorten notice contract provision
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           The June 19, 2026 article discussed an action by a homeowner who sued her pre-purchase home inspection company.  One of the company’s defenses, that the contract prohibited commencement of a lawsuit after one year conflicted with the three- year statute of limitations in Mississippi and could not be shortened by contract. The court agreed and that and a few other issues, ended up having the contract tossed as unconscionable.  Here’s a case against ADT adjudicated in Delaware. 
              ADT was sued and wins because the customer waited too long to sue. The alarm company’s contract had a one-year limitation on bringing suit. The customer waited more than one year. Case over.
            In Soul v. Christiansen, et al., C.A. No. K25C-01-026 NEP, decided May 11, 2026, the Delaware Superior Court granted ADT Security Services LLC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the claims against ADT.  ADT was sued by a home owner who alleged:
          “on February 9, 2023, Soul's home alarm was triggered, prompting a response by the Dover Police Department (“DPD”), which, according to Soul, resulted in a warrantless entry into her residence without exigent circumstances and with the assistance of ADT.  Soul further alleges that certain municipal employees, including Kay Sass, participated in communications that led to the alteration or omission of material facts in DPD's reports, and that ADT subsequently manipulated digital logs to conceal the circumstances of the entry.”
          The homeowner alleged a bunch of claims, including:
          “causes of action including: (i) a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for unlawful entry; (ii) invasion of privacy and breach of contract under Delaware law; (iii) racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (iv) negligence; (v) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (vi) malicious prosecution; and (vii) debt collection harassment under federal law.13 Soul alleges that Defendants’ conduct caused emotional distress and financial loss, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and other relief.”
          ADT moved to dismiss the lawsuit. ADT’s argued in support of the motion:
          “ADT argues that Soul's claims are barred by the parties’ contract, which requires suit to be brought within one year of the alleged loss and limits any recoverable damages to $500.30 ADT further contends that it complied with its contractual obligations by receiving the alarm signal, attempting verification calls, and notifying law enforcement, and therefore cannot be liable for breach of contract or related claims.31 ADT also argues that Soul's tort and statutory liability claims fail as a matter of law,32 and that it did not engage in any conduct constituting an invasion of privacy”
         The ADT contract required that any lawsuit be brought within one year after the alleged loss. The contract also limited recoverable damages to $500. The alleged incident occurred on February 9, 2023. The lawsuit was not filed until January 17, 2025, more than a year after the loss.
         The Court enforced the contractual limitation and dismissed the claims against ADT, also rejecting the Plaintiff’s argument that the $500 limitation of liability was unconscionable.
          This decision is more in line with most states [Mississippi is one exception because there is a specific statute].  The court cited prior cases setting a solid precedent. Delaware court has enforced an alarm company’s contractual limitation on the time within which a customer may sue. The Court relied upon Rob-Win, Inc. v. Lydia Security Monitoring, Inc., 2007 WL 3360036 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 2007), as well as Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tri-Plex Security Alarm Systems, 622 A.2d 1086 (Del. Super. 1992).
               Those cases are important because they demonstrate that contractual limitations in alarm agreements are not just theoretical provisions. When properly drafted and enforceable under applicable state law, they can provide a very effective defense.
             The Court also addressed the plaintiff’s substantive allegations against ADT. The plaintiff claimed that ADT breached its contract. The Court found that the complaint did not adequately identify a specific contractual obligation that ADT breached. ADT contended that it received the alarm signal, attempted verification calls and notified law enforcement, which were the services it was required to provide under the agreement.
            The plaintiff also attempted to assert tort claims. Those claims did not save the lawsuit. 
            The invasion-of-privacy claim failed because the allegations did not establish that ADT itself intruded upon the plaintiff’s private affairs. The intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim also failed because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to support that cause of action.
             The malicious-prosecution claim failed because ADT had not instituted or continued a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff.
             The judge granted ADT’s motion to dismiss the case.
            There are several lessons here for alarm companies.
*  First, have a properly drafted and updated contract.  You get that here: https://app.kirschenbaumesq.com/alarm-contract
* Second, make sure the customer actually agreed to the contract.  Other articles have discussed proper execution of the contract.
* Third, be sure to keep the contract and your records of the alarm history.
       The case is below
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Superior Court of Delaware.

M. SOUL, Plaintiff, v. Robin R. CHRISTIANSEN, Mayor of Dover, Delaware; City of Dover; Dover Police Department; ADT Security Services LLC, Inc.; C.A. No.: K25C-01-026 NEP Submitted: February 13, 2026 Decided: May 11, 2026

Upon the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint GRANTED

Upon ADT Security Services, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings GRANTED

ORDER

Noel Eason Primos, Judge

*1 Upon consideration of dispositive motions filed by Defendants,2 the Court finds as follows: 

1. On January 17, 2025, M. Soul (“Soul”) filed a Complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis.3 The Complaint asserted federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and related state law causes of action arising from an alleged warrantless entry into Soul's residence on February 9, 2023.4 The affidavit attached indicated that Soul was unemployed and had no income or assets other than her home.5

2. On February 3, 2025, Soul filed an Amended Complaint as of right pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 15(a).6 The Amended Complaint removed the United States of America as a defendant, omitted the federal civil rights claims, and clarified certain factual allegations and the roles of individual defendants, while leaving the underlying claims largely unchanged.7

3. Soon after, the Court learned of material nondisclosures made by Soul in her affidavit, namely, that Soul had represented in prior litigation that she receives disability payments through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which she failed to include in her January 17 application to proceed in forma pauperis.

4. On March 21, 2025, the Court issued an Order allowing Soul the opportunity to file a revised affidavit to accurately reflect all income she receives.8 On April 2, 2025, upon review of Soul's revised affidavit, the Court denied the revised application to proceed in forma pauperis.9

5. On July 17, 2025, Soul filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) asserting federal civil rights claims and various state law causes of action against multiple municipal and private defendants (collectively, “Defendants”), including ADT Security Services LLC, Inc. (“ADT”).10 The SAC alleges that, on February 9, 2023, Soul's home alarm was triggered, prompting a response by the Dover Police Department (“DPD”), which, according to Soul, resulted in a warrantless entry into her residence without exigent circumstances and with the assistance of ADT.11 Soul further alleges that certain municipal employees, including Kay Sass, participated in communications that led to the alteration or omission of material facts in DPD's reports, and that ADT subsequently manipulated digital logs to conceal the circumstances of the entry.12

*2 6. The SAC names as defendants Dover Mayor Robin R. Christiansen (“Christiansen”), the City of Dover (“the City”), DPD, Kent County, individual police officers, ADT, unidentified John Doe(s), and Kay Sass (“Sass”), and asserts causes of action including: (i) a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for unlawful entry; (ii) invasion of privacy and breach of contract under Delaware law; (iii) racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (iv) negligence; (v) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (vi) malicious prosecution; and (vii) debt collection harassment under federal law.13 Soul alleges that Defendants’ conduct caused emotional distress and financial loss, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and other relief.14

7. On August 7, 2025, Defendants Christiansen, the City, DPD, PFC Burton, PTLM Shepherd, SGT Gott, PFC Spence, and Sass (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”), filed a Motion to Dismiss the SAC pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6).15 In their motion, the Municipal Defendants argue that Soul has failed to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.16

Specifically, the Municipal Defendants contend that Soul's Fourth Amendment claim fails because the responding officers acted pursuant to exigent circumstances created by a triggered alarm and an unsecured door;17 that Soul's racial discrimination claim is conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations of discriminatory intent;18 and that Soul's state law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution are barred by the Delaware County and Municipal Tort Claims Act (the “DCMTCA”), 10 Del. C. § 4011, because Soul has not alleged property damage, bodily injury, or death.19

8. The Municipal Defendants further argue that Soul has failed to state a viable § 1983 claim against the City because the SAC does not allege a policy or custom sufficient to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,20 and that Soul has not alleged personal involvement sufficient to sustain claims against Christiansen.21 Additionally, the Municipal Defendants assert that Soul's claims against Sass are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations, as she was first named in the SAC filed more than two years after the underlying incident.22

9. On August 26, 2025, Soul filed an Opposition to the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the SAC.23 In her Opposition, Soul largely reiterates the factual allegations set forth in the SAC, again asserting that the February 9, 2023, incident involved a false alarm, that DPD entered her residence without a warrant or exigent circumstances, and that Defendants subsequently engaged in a coordinated effort to conceal the nature of that entry through altered reports and records.24

10. Soul argues that the Municipal Defendants’ reliance on exigent circumstances is misplaced, contending that a triggered alarm and an unlocked door, without more, do not justify warrantless entry.25 She further maintains that her pleadings sufficiently allege a Fourth Amendment violation, municipal liability, and personal involvement by Christiansen, and that her racial discrimination claim is supported by allegations of disparate treatment and a broader pattern of conduct.26 Soul also disputes the applicability of immunity under the DCMTCA, asserting that Defendants’ conduct falls within statutory exceptions for wanton or malicious conduct, and contends that her claims against Sass are timely under theories of equitable tolling and continuing violation.27

*3 11. On November 6, 2025, ADT filed its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, denying liability and asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim, comparative fault, and contractual limitations on Soul's claims.28 Thereafter, on December 22, 2025, ADT filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(c).29

12. In its motion, ADT argues that Soul's claims are barred by the parties’ contract, which requires suit to be brought within one year of the alleged loss and limits any recoverable damages to $500.30 ADT further contends that it complied with its contractual obligations by receiving the alarm signal, attempting verification calls, and notifying law enforcement, and therefore cannot be liable for breach of contract or related claims.31 ADT also argues that Soul's tort and statutory liability claims fail as a matter of law,32 and that it did not engage in any conduct constituting an invasion of privacy.33

13. On January 20, 2026, the Municipal Defendants submitted a letter to the Court providing subsequent authority in support of their Motion to Dismiss the SAC.34 The provided authority, Case v. Montana,35 decided January 14, 2026, addresses the scope of the Fourth Amendment's emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement.

14. On January 22, 2026, Soul filed an Opposition to ADT's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.36 Soul primarily reiterates the factual allegations underlying the SAC and asserts that ADT breached its contractual obligations, that the warrantless entry into her residence lacked sufficient exigency, and that Defendants engaged in discriminatory and otherwise unlawful conduct.37 Soul further argues that the one-year limitations period on bringing suit pursuant to breaches of contract is void as contrary to public policy and inconsistent with Delaware's longer statutory limitations period, and that the contractual damages cap is unreasonable and unconscionable in light of various harms.38 Additionally, to support her argument that the DCMTCA does not bar her state law claims, Soul alleges that “property-damage-like loss of security and emotional distress” should be treated as falling within the “property damage, bodily injury, or death” exceptions to the municipal immunity conferred by the DCMTCA.39 Soul does not address the subsequent authority submitted by the Municipal Defendants in support of their Motion to Dismiss.

*4 15. On September 22, 2025, and February 13, 2026, the Court heard oral argument on the parties’ motions and took the matter under advisement.40

16. As a preliminary matter, the Court first addresses the procedural propriety of the SAC. Superior Court Civil Rule 15(a) provides that “[a] party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.”41 Otherwise, a party may amend only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.42 Here, Soul filed an initial complaint and thereafter amended once as of right.43 Soul's subsequent filing of the SAC, without leave of Court, was procedurally improper.44 Nevertheless, the record reflects that Defendants responded to the SAC by filing dispositive motions and an answer without objecting to the procedural defect or seeking to strike the pleading.45 By engaging the merits of the SAC without raising Rule 15(a), Defendants have waived any objection to its procedural impropriety. Accordingly, the Court treats the SAC as the operative pleading for purposes of resolving the pending motions.

17. The Court also notes that the parties’ briefing evaluates Soul's federal claims under the “plausibility” standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly46 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.47 However, that is not the governing pleading standard in Delaware. This Court applies the more liberal “reasonable conceivability” standard when assessing a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), under which a complaint will survive if the plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.48 Importantly, this standard applies even to federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981.49 Accordingly, while federal precedent may be instructive as to the substantive elements of Soul's federal causes of action,50 the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the pleadings under Delaware's notice pleading framework rather than the heightened federal plausibility standard.

18. In the instant case, the Municipal Defendants have submitted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. A party may move to dismiss under this Court's Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.51 In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “must draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.”52 In considering such a motion, “the court will accept all well-pleaded allegations as true.”53 To be well-pleaded, a complaint must include specific allegations of fact,54 and the Court's review is limited to the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.55 Dismissal is warranted “only if it appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts that would entitle [her] to relief.”56 However, the Court will “ignore conclusory allegations that lack specific supporting factual allegations.”57

*5 19. ADT has submitted a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court cannot grant judgment on the pleadings unless, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, no material factual dispute exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.58 In resolving a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court accepts the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant.59

20. “The standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is almost identical to the standard for a motion to dismiss.”60 As such, the Court accords the party opposing a Rule 12(c) motion the same benefits as a party defending a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.61 Given that the Municipal Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion and ADT's 12(c) motion challenge the same operative pleading and are governed by materially identical standards, the Court will consider these motions together in assessing the sufficiency of the SAC.

21. Soul's allegations, taken as true for purposes of this Order, are as follows: On February 9, 2023, ADT alerted DPD that Soul's home alarm had been triggered.62 ADT then relayed the alarm signal to DPD and assisted the responding officers in entering Soul's home.63 The responding officers—PFC Burton, PTLM Shepherd, SGT Gott, and PFC Spence—searched every room of the residence, leaving lights and closet doors open.64 Afterward, Sass, an employee of the Mayor's Office who had communicated with Soul about her alarm and home security setup, communicated with municipal staff, and an unidentified individual (John Doe) then altered the DPD field report to omit that the door alarm had been triggered and that doors were left open.65 ADT further manipulated its digital logs and time stamps to conceal that officers had entered through the side door, left interior doors open, and changed the alarm records from doors to windows.66 Soul, an African American homeowner, avers that racial bias contributed to the dismissive and negligent handling of her complaints.67

22. Soul brings seven enumerated legal claims:

(1) DPD's warrantless entry into Soul's home violated Soul's Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(2) ADT's manipulation of its digital logs and security records constituted a breach of contract and an invasion of privacy.

(3) Defendants’ actions constituted unlawful racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

(4) Defendants breached their duty of care to “monitor accurately, supervise employees, and respect constitutional rights,” constituting negligence.

(5) Defendants’ actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(6) Defendants maliciously subjected Soul to “unwarranted ‘welfare checks,’ baseless investigations, and false reports [to] intimidate and harass her,” allegedly constituting malicious prosecution.

*6 (7) ADT's referral of a disputed debt to collections and the subsequent debt-collector telephone calls constituted harassment and false representation of a debt in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.

23. Soul's prayer for relief requests $75,000 in compensatory damages; punitive damages; damages for mental anguish, insomnia, anxiety, and ongoing emotional harm; costs including filing fees; and any additional relief the Court sees fit to grant.68

24. The Court first notes that Soul may not maintain an action against the “John Doe” Defendants employed by the Dover Mayor's Office or DPD. Any claim against an unnamed defendant must be dismissed.69 Thus, all claims against these Defendants fail.

25. The Court also notes that Soul may not maintain claims against Kent County. The record does not reflect that Soul filed a praecipe for service upon Kent County or otherwise perfected service on Kent County as a separate defendant. Regardless, Kent County is a separate governmental entity from the City and DPD, and the SAC does not allege facts showing that Kent County had any role in the challenged conduct by the Municipal Defendants. The only allegations directed specifically at Kent County—that it has “[s]upervisory authority over county-level enforcement and municipal cooperation[ ]”70 and that it “negligently trained municipal staff and officers[ ]”71—are conclusory and unsupported by any facts tying Kent County to the alleged conduct of the Municipal Defendants. Likewise, neither Opposition filed by Soul against the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions identifies any independent claim against Kent County. Accordingly, all claims against Kent County are dismissed.

26. The Court next addresses Soul's Fourth Amendment claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”72 Courts applying that principle have held that a triggered residential alarm may create the requisite exigency to justify a limited warrantless entry to investigate a potential emergency.73 This Court has also recognized the “Emergency Doctrine,” wherein police may, in appropriate circumstances, make an otherwise illegal entry if there is an immediate need for the assistance of police to protect life or property.74 Here, the facts alleged in the SAC indicate that responding officers were dispatched after Soul's residential alarm was triggered, signaling a potential burglary or emergency. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted in both her initial complaint and her first amended complaint that she had left her exterior door unlocked.75 Those facts bring this case within the established line of authority recognizing that a triggered residential alarm, with other circumstances present such as an unlocked door, creates an objectively reasonable basis for officers to enter a home without a warrant.76 The Court's conclusion in this regard is further supported by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Case v. Montana,77 which held that officers may enter a home without a warrant where they have “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.”78 Although Case was decided in a criminal context and did not involve the activation of a residential alarm, its reasoning signals a shift away from stringent requirements to justify warrantless entries where circumstances dictate otherwise. In the instant case, the Court finds that the officers’ entry into Soul's home was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Soul's Fourth Amendment claim also fails.

*7 27. Soul's racial discrimination claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 likewise fails. “To prevail [on a § 1981 racial discrimination claim,] a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [she] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.”79 Here, the SAC fails at the threshold. Although the SAC contains a passing assertion that Soul is an “African American homeowner,”80 she offers no factual allegations suggesting that similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated more favorably or that Defendants’ conduct was motivated by racial animus. Such conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific factual allegations, are insufficient to state a claim under § 1981.81

28. Turning to the state law claims directed toward the Municipal Defendants—(4) negligence, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) malicious prosecution—Soul may not maintain those claims against DPD or the City. The DCMTCA gives government entities broad immunity from suit on “any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages.”82 10 Del. C. § 4012 contains three narrowly drawn83 exceptions to this immunity. “The activities enumerated in § 4012 are an exclusive list and are the only activities to which municipal immunity is waived.”84 Soul has failed to plead any such exception within the SAC.85 As such, Soul's claims against these Defendants fail.

29. For similar reasons, Soul is barred from bringing her claims against the named government employee Defendants. 10 Del. C. § 4011(c) does allow for the personal liability of government employees, but only in carefully circumscribed circumstances. Most relevant here, the acts or omissions complained of must “caus[e] property damage, bodily injury, or death[.]”86 The SAC fails to indicate that she suffered either property damage or bodily injury from the actions of the named government employee Defendants.87 Instead, Soul claims to have suffered severe emotional distress. Emotional distress is not “bodily injury” in the context of the Tort Claims Act.88 Since Soul has not alleged injury waiving these defendants’ immunity, Soul may not maintain an action against them.89 Accordingly, Soul's claims against Christiansen, Sass, and the named DPD officers will be dismissed.

*8 30. Given the foregoing analysis, Soul's only remaining claims—(2) invasion of privacy and breach of contract, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) malicious prosecution, and (7) debt collection harassment—pertain to ADT. Those claims are time-barred. The contract governing Soul's relationship with ADT expressly provides that “[n]o suit or action shall be brought against ADT after the shorter of (1) one year after the date of loss or (2) the time allowed by law.”90 The alleged conduct giving rise to Soul's claims occurred on February 9, 2023,91 yet Soul did not initiate the instant action until well over one year later. Delaware courts routinely enforce such contractual limitations provisions, as consistent with public policy and the principle of freedom of contract.92 Here, the SAC does not allege any facts that would render the contractual limitations period unenforceable, nor does it advance any theory (e.g., unconscionability) to avoid its application. Accordingly, the Court finds that Soul's claims against ADT are barred by the parties’ agreement, and that the contractual bar is dispositive. Moreover, even if Soul's claims against ADT were not barred by the contractual limitations period, they would independently fail based on the pleadings, and the Court will therefore address them in the alternative.

31. First, Soul's invasion of privacy claim fails. In support of this claim, Soul alleges that, by “altering logs to hide police entry and fail[ure] to report accurately that doors remained open and no window alarms sounded,” ADT “invaded [Soul's] privacy and eroded her trust and confidence in home security.”93 Delaware recognizes four torts related to invasion of privacy: (i) intrusion on the plaintiff's physical solitude; (ii) publication of private matters violating the ordinary decencies; (iii) putting plaintiff in a false position in the public eye; and (iv) appropriation of some element of plaintiff's personality for commercial use.”94 Soul does not specify which of these torts is implicated by these facts. As to the allegations against ADT, however, only the first two are relevant, and neither entitles Soul to relief. ADT did not itself intrude on a private seclusion, and merely exposing Soul to a risk of intrusion by others does not create liability for the first variety of privacy invasion.95 Likewise, Soul's allegations against ADT fail to support a claim that ADT published private matters violating the ordinary decencies: liability under this prong cannot attach when the private matters shared are communicated to a small group, such as, in this case, law enforcement dispatchers—even if the recipients then communicate them to a broader population.96 Accordingly, the SAC does not plead a reasonably conceivable invasion of privacy claim against ADT.

 32. Soul also contends, in connection with the same events, that ADT breached its contract with Soul.97 “In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate: first the existence of the contract, whether express or implied; second, the breach of an obligation imposed by that contract; and third, the resultant damage to the plaintiff.”98 Such a claim must “alleg[e] specific contractual obligations of the defendant, describe[ ] how [the] defendant's conduct constituted a breach of those obligations, and articulate[ ] damages resulting from the breach.”99 Soul has not identified any specific contractual obligations that ADT violated. Consequently, Soul's contractual claim against ADT would fail even in the absence of the contractual limitations period.

*9 33. Soul has also failed to state a claim against ADT for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). “A claim for [IIED] ... requires proof that the [defendant] intentionally engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct that caused severe emotional distress.”100 In light of the fact that intent may be averred generally,101 the Court's principal concern in evaluating Soul's IIED claim is whether any act committed by ADT was sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED claim. “If reasonable minds may differ, the question of whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous is for the jury.”102 This principle is not a free pass for plaintiffs, however. “It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.”103 Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”104 “Even if the alleged conduct constitutes ‘tortious or ... criminal’ acts toward the plaintiff, it does not necessarily, by itself, rise to the level of ‘extreme and outrageous[.]’ ”105

34. Soul grounds her IIED theory in the allegation that “[ADT] willfully orchestrated an unlawful home invasion, manipulated records, and then stonewalled [Soul's] attempts to seek redress ....”106 Those allegations do not state a claim for IIED. Even accepting the allegations in the SAC as true, Soul alleges, at most, that ADT received an alarm signal, contacted law enforcement, assisted DPD in entering her home, and later altered or failed to accurately maintain security records. Those allegations may reflect Soul's dissatisfaction with ADT's alarm-monitoring services and its later handling of her complaints, but they do not describe conduct so outrageous in character or extreme in degree such that it is actionable as IIED. Indeed, Delaware courts have refused to entertain prospective IIED claims in instances involving conduct that, in the Court's view, is more outrageous than that in the instant case.107 The characterization that ADT “orchestrated” a home invasion does not transform a standard residential alarm response and alleged recordkeeping dispute into conduct that is atrocious or utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The SAC therefore does not allege conduct sufficiently extreme or outrageous to support IIED liability.

35. Soul's malicious prosecution theory fares no better. To succeed in a suit for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must be able to prove, among other things, that there was a prior institution or continuation of some regular judicial proceeding against the plaintiff.108 Since every element of malicious prosecution must be pled, Soul's claim cannot survive.109 There can be no malicious prosecution without prosecution. More importantly, there cannot be malicious prosecution by a defendant who did not institute or continue such a proceeding.110

 ADT did not institute or continue any judicial proceeding against Soul, and Soul pleads no facts supporting a reasonably conceivable inference to the contrary.

*10 36. The last of Soul's claims against ADT—her debt collection harassment claim—also fails. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., “prohibits ‘debt collector[s]’ from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices.”111 “Because the FDCPA is a remedial statute, the Third Circuit has construed its language broadly so as to give effect to its purpose.”112 A plaintiff bringing an FDCPA claim must show that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as [the statute] defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA by attempting to collect the debt.”113 Here, the SAC fails to plead facts sufficient to satisfy these elements. Although Soul alleges that ADT referred a disputed account to collections and that she received subsequent telephone calls,114 she does not allege that ADT itself is a “debt collector” within the meaning of the statute, as opposed to a creditor collecting its own debt, nor does she identify any specific conduct that would constitute a prohibited practice under the FDCPA. The SAC also fails to include any factual allegations regarding the identity or conduct of any third-party debt collector sufficient to establish liability under the FDCPA. Instead, Soul offers only conclusory assertions that the collection efforts were “harassment” and “false representation of debt,” without accompanying factual allegations.115 Accordingly, Soul'd FDCPA claim is unsupported by the pleadings.

37. The Court observes some differences between the facts alleged in the SAC and Soul's responses to the dispositive motions. While it is understandable for Soul to attempt to reframe the alleged facts surrounding her claims to survive Defendants’ 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions, “[a] post hoc attempt to clarify allegations in a complaint in response to a motion to dismiss [or motion for judgment on the pleadings] ‘cannot be received as a supplement or amendment to the pleading itself.’ ”116 “The complaint generally defines the universe of facts that the trial court may consider in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”117

38. The Court is willing, “[i]n recognition of the difficulties faced by pro se litigants ... [t]o hold a pro se complaint to a less stringent standard than that filed by an attorney” when appropriate.118 Such accommodation does not mean, however, that pro se plaintiffs are subject to a different set of rules.119 “The Court's accommodations cannot impair the substantive rights of parties nor the efficient administration of justice to ‘save claims that plainly have no merit.’ ”120
WHEREFORE, in light of the preceding considerations, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Citations and footnotes omitted

End of document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Ken Kirschenbaum,Esq
Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum PC
Attorneys at Law
200 Garden City Plaza
Garden City, NY 11530
516 747 6700 x 301
ken@kirschenbaumesq.com
www.KirschenbaumEsq.com