ADT wins case alleging exposure to the alarm caused hearing loss and tinnitus / ISC East private meetings October 15, 2025

KEN KIRSCHENBAUM, ESQ
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ADT wins case alleging exposure to the alarm caused  hearing loss and tinnitus / ISC East private meetings
October 15,  2025
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ADT wins case alleging exposure to the alarm caused  hearing loss and tinnitus 
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    ADT can chalk up another win, this one in Georgia.  Commercial subscriber entered building to turn off a false alarm and was exposed to an alarm, described as "loud and continuous".  The case does not indicate if the alarm was from a bell or siren, but the system, manufactured by Ademco, is the Security Manager 2000.  It's sold by ADT all over the country.  Plaintiff's expert determined that the alarm emits a sound between 98 and 107 decibels and further concluded that Plaintiff was likely exposed to between 105 and 107 decibels when disarming the alarm for about 15 seconds. In fact, the Security Manager 2000 is equipped with a special “burglary/audible emergency alarm” feature and the user guide describes the sound of that specific feature as “LOUD, CONTINUOUS,” but there is no evidence that the product included any other warning about the volume of the sounder. 
    The court noted that the American Academy of Audiology describes 60 decibels as the volume of a typical conversation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) sets permissible noise exposure at 2 hours per day for 100 decibels, 1.5 hours per day for 102 decibels and 0.5 hours per day for 110 decibels. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), a division of the Center for Disease Control, recommends noise exposure levels of no more than 1 hour for 94 A-weighted decibels, 0.5 hours for 97 A-weighted decibels and 0.25 hours for 100 A-weighted decibels. UL standards require that burglar alarms emit a sound of at least 85 decibels when ten feet away from the sounder.
    The court noted that UL standards are industry standards, not regulations, but some states, namely, Maryland, Texas, Oregon and New York, require that all burglar alarms be UL-certified such that alarm companies are prohibited from installing a non-certified alarm.
    I've addressed exposure to liability for excessive alarm noise in prior articles.  This case addresses the appropriate level of noise and exposure times. 
    ADT's motion for summary judgment was granted and the case dismissed.
Here is the case in its entirety:
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2025 WL 2795900
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.
ROBERT WEBB, Plaintiff,
v.
ADT LLC OF DELAWARE, Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-00846-JPB
Filed 08/21/2025
ORDER
J. P. BOULEE United States District Judge
*1 This matter is before the Court on ADT LLC of Delaware's (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 26] and Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions [Doc. 27]. The Court finds as follows:
BACKGROUND
The Court derives the facts of this case from Defendant's Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 26-1], Robert Webb's (“Plaintiff”) Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 34] and Defendant's Reply in Support of Its Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 37]. The Court also conducted its own review of the record.
The Local Rules of this Court require a respondent to a summary judgment motion to include with its responsive brief “[a] response to the movant's statement of undisputed facts.” LR 56.1(B)(2)(a), NDGa. The Local Rules make clear that the Court
will deem each of the movant's facts as admitted unless the respondent: (i) directly refutes the movant's fact with concise responses supported by specific citations to evidence (including page or paragraph number); (ii) states a valid objection to the admissibility of the movant's fact; or (iii) points out that the movant's citation does not support the movant's fact or that the movant's fact is not material or otherwise has failed to comply with the provisions set out in LR 56.1(B)(1).
LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. Similarly,
[i]f respondent provides a statement of additional material facts, then, within the time allowed for filing a reply, the movant shall file a response to each of the respondent's facts. The range of acceptable responses is limited to: (a) an objection to the admissibility of the evidence upon which the respondent relies, (b) an objection pointing out that the respondent's evidence does not support the respondent's fact[,] (c) an objection on the ground that the respondent's fact is not material or does not otherwise comply with the provisions set out in LR 56.1(B)(1), and (d) a concession that the Court can properly consider the respondent's evidence for purposes of the summary judgment motion.
LR 56.1(B)(3), NDGa.
In accordance with the Local Rules, this Court will not consider unsupported facts. Plaintiff did not file a statement of additional material facts, so the Court will accept Defendant's facts to the extent they are supported by the record, construing any genuine dispute in Plaintiff's favor. LR 56.1(B), NDGa. Thus, for the purpose of adjudicating the instant motion, the facts of this case are as follows:
I. The Incident
On January 9, 2023, a contractor performed various repairs at Plaintiff's office. [Doc. 34, p. 2]. At the end of the day, the contractor left the office building and walked to his car. Id. Plaintiff activated the burglar alarm and exited the building shortly thereafter. Id. When Plaintiff left, the contractor was still outside in his vehicle. Id. Plaintiff asked if it was okay to lock up, and the contractor quickly headed back into the office. Id. Plaintiff did not warn the contractor to disable the alarm before entering. Id. at 3.
The contractor was inside the office for around ten seconds while Plaintiff waited outside. Id. Soon after the contractor left the building, the office burglar alarm sounded. Id. Plaintiff then went back inside to deactivate the alarm. Id. It took Plaintiff ten to fifteen seconds to walk from the door to the alarm keypad, punch in the code and turn the alarm off. Id. Plaintiff claims that the brief exposure to the alarm caused him permanent hearing loss and tinnitus, but he did not call ADT at the time because “the alarm went off the way it was supposed to.” Id. at 1, 13.1 Therefore, “there wasn't anything to tell them that had been done wrong.” Id. at 13.
II. The Alarm
Plaintiff's office alarm was a “Security Manager 2000.” Id. at 5. One purpose of that alarm system is to deter burglars, and Plaintiff, indeed, purchased the alarm with the goal of preventing theft from break-ins. Id. at 14. To fulfill its anti-burglary purpose, the Security Manager 2000 is equipped with a special “burglary/audible emergency alarm” feature. Id. The user guide describes the sound of that specific feature as “LOUD, CONTINUOUS,” but there is no evidence that the product included any other warning about the volume of the sounder. Id.
Significantly, the Security Manager 2000 is manufactured by a company called Ademco, which is not a party to this lawsuit. Id. at 5. Defendant played no role in designing or manufacturing the Security Manager 2000. Id. at 5–6. Defendant merely installs alarms, including the Security Manager 2000, in homes and businesses. Id.
III. Safety of the Product
Each party retained an expert in this case to ascertain the volume of the alarm and opine on the safety of the design. Id. at 4. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. John Franks, determined that the alarm emits a sound between 98 and 107 decibels and further concluded that Plaintiff was likely exposed to between 105 and 107 decibels when disarming the alarm. Id. Dr. Franks offered the following opinion regarding an appropriate decibel level for an alarm in Plaintiff's office:
Given that the background noise level in [Plaintiff's office] was around 45 dBA, an alarm level of 60 dBA would have been adequate. Adding an additional 15 dB to reach 75 dBA would have resulted in a clearly heard alarm that would not have put the auditory integrity of the person having to disarm the alarm at risk.
Id. at 10; [Doc. 26-5, p. 12]. In other words, Dr. Franks suggested the office's burglar alarm should have had a maximum volume of no more than 75 A-weighted decibels and that 60 A-weighted decibels would have sufficed.2 [Doc. 34, p. 10].
To put those numbers into perspective, the American Academy of Audiology describes 60 decibels as the volume of a typical conversation. Id. at 10. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) sets permissible noise exposure at 2 hours per day for 100 decibels, 1.5 hours per day for 102 decibels and 0.5 hours per day for 110 decibels. Id. at 12. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), a division of the Center for Disease Control, recommends noise exposure levels of no more than 1 hour for 94 A-weighted decibels, 0.5 hours for 97 A-weighted decibels and 0.25 hours for 100 A-weighted decibels. Id. Dr. Franks conceded that if the alarm emitted 60 decibels at the sounder, a burglar breaking into a back office with a closed door may not even hear the alarm. Id. at 11.
Notably, neither Plaintiff's expert nor Defendant's expert opined on whether Defendant adequately warned its customers of the potential harmful effects of exposure to the alarm's sounder. Id at 7.3 Moreover, the experts did not provide any examples of warnings that would have adequately informed customers of the potential for auditory harm. Id.4
IV. Alarm Manufacturing, Compliance & Oversight
*3 As an alarm installation service operating in all fifty states, Defendant tries to ensure its alarm systems are optimally designed to comply with the patchwork of regulatory requirements that exist nationwide. Id. at 6. To that end, Defendant checks that its products follow the standards set by the Underwriters Laboratory (“UL”). Id. Significantly, UL standards require that burglar alarms emit a sound of at least 85 decibels when ten feet away from the sounder. Id. at 13. Compliance with UL standards generally begins with the manufacturer. Id. at 6. The manufacturer will design and produce a sounder to meet UL specifications and send a sample of their products to the UL for an evaluation. Id. If the product meets the requirements, the UL will apply a sticker to the product, certifying it as UL-compliant. Id.
Of course, UL standards are industry standards, not regulations. But some states—namely, Maryland, Texas, Oregon and New York—require that all burglar alarms be UL-certified such that Defendant is prohibited from installing a non-certified alarm. Id. For that reason, Defendant has determined that “it's just easier to mandate all [alarms] are UL listed.” Id. The City of Marietta Building Code (“MBC”), which applies to this case, does not strictly follow UL specifications. Id. at 9.5 Rather, the MBC sets out a maximum sound pressure level for audible alarm notifications at 110 A-weighted decibels. Id.
It is undisputed that the volume of Plaintiff's alarm was below the maximum volume limit set by the MBC and above the UL's minimum decibel requirement for burglar alarms. Id. In other words, Plaintiff's alarm comported with local regulations and was UL-compliant. Id.
V. The Instant Lawsuit
Plaintiff's injuries from the alarm prompted him to file the instant lawsuit on January 3, 2024, bringing the following claims against Defendant: (1) negligence in manufacturing and sales; (2) failure to warn; (3) post-sale failure to warn; and (4) breach of the implied warranty. Id. at 1; [Doc. 1-1]. The case proceeded to discovery, which concluded on February 15, 2025. Upon the close of discovery, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment, [Doc. 26], and motion to exclude certain opinions of Plaintiff's expert, Dr. John Franks, [Doc. 27]. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to exclude on March 10, 2025, [Doc. 28], and later filed a response to the summary judgment motion in which he defended his negligence in manufacturing and sales and failure to warn claims but did not defend his breach of warranty claim, [Doc. 33]. Defendant filed replies in support of both of its motions. [Doc. 35]; [Doc. 36]. Defendant's motions are now ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is any fact that “is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Ultimately, “[t]he basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (citation omitted).
*4 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, “and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. After the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmovant bears the burden of showing specific facts indicating summary judgment is improper. Id. However, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). If the record taken as a whole cannot lead “a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
The Court begins its analysis with the motion for summary judgment. As discussed, Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims. Because Plaintiff's claims for “negligence in manufacturing and sales” and for “failure to warn” each sound in negligence, the Court will address those claims together. Then, the Court will consider Plaintiff's breach of warranty claim.
I. Negligence Claims
Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claims. “[T]o state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the following essential elements: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of this duty; (3) an injury; and (4) a causal connection between the breach and the injury.” Martin v. Ledbetter, 802 S.E.2d 432, 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). The duty can arise either through legislative enactment or common law, and the existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court. Fletcher v. Water Applications Distrib. Grp., Inc., 773 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). Once a duty is established, the plaintiff can recover upon a showing that “observance of [the] duty would have averted or avoided the injury or damage.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff brings three negligence claims—negligence in manufacturing and sale, failure to warn and post-sale failure to warn—that ostensibly arise from Defendant's breach of distinct duties. The Court will first address the negligence in manufacturing and sales claim before turning to the failure to warn claims.
A. Negligence in Manufacturing & Sales
Defendant argues that the “negligence in manufacturing and sales” claim improperly seeks to impose liability under a design defect theory and, ultimately, fails for want of any legal duty owed by Defendant, a non-manufacturer. Under Georgia common law, “when designing a product, a manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in ‘selecting from among alternative product designs’ to ‘reduce[ ] the [reasonably] foreseeable risks of harm presented by [a] product.’ ” Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 870 S.E.2d 739, 745 (Ga. 2022). Similarly, “under Georgia's product-liability statute, a manufacturer who sells a product has a duty to ensure that the product it sells does not have a design defect.” Id. As such, “a plaintiff injured by a defectively designed product can pursue a claim against a manufacturer under either a statutory strict-liability theory or a decisional-law negligence theory or both.” Id. at 745–46. Regardless of the plaintiff's chosen “theory of recovery, the factfinder performs a ‘risk-utility analysis,’ assessing ‘the reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product designs’ by asking whether ‘the risk of harm outweighs the utility of a particular design.’ ” Id. at 746 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's “negligence in manufacturing and sales” claim seeks to impose liability for design defects against a mere seller of a product, rather than the manufacturer or designer. The distinction is significant. Plaintiff has not proffered—nor has this Court found—any Georgia case requiring a mere seller to ensure its products are not defective or to choose a reasonable product design among possible alternatives. In fact, “[i]n Georgia, a product seller does not have a duty to test the products which it sells” and “may rely on the manufacturer to have properly created the product.” Williams v. Pac. Cycle, Inc., No. 13-CV-875, 2015 WL 11215854, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2015) (citing Fed. Ins. Co. v. Farmer's Supply Store, Inc., 555 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)), aff'd, 661 F. App'x 716 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, while a mere seller can be liable for failure to warn when it has constructive notice of a defect, it cannot be held liable simply for the presence of design defects in products it played no role in designing or manufacturing. See Smith v. Ont. Sewing Mach. Co., 548 S.E.2d 89, 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that “seller-dealers” typically have “a duty only to warn” and have “no duty to issue a recall warning and to remediate [a] dangerous known defect in design” unless they assume that duty by voluntarily issuing a recall), rev'd on other grounds, 572 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 2002); see also Williams, 661 F. App'x at 720 (affirming summary judgment for a seller on a negligent sale, design, manufacturing, distribution and importation claim because “[t]o be liable for negligent manufacture or design a company .... must have had some involvement in the manufacture or design of the product” and because the seller had “no duty to test or inspect the product” for defects).
*5 Accordingly, as the parties now agree that Defendant did not manufacture or design the Security Manager 2000, the Court finds the negligent manufacturing aspect of Plaintiff's claim is ceded and the negligent sales part of the claim is properly analyzed under a “failure to warn” framework, rather than a design defect framework. To the extent the claim is not construed as a failure to warn claim, Defendant's motion is GRANTED as to this cause of action because it relies on duties owed by product manufacturers and designers, not mere sellers or distributors like Defendant.
B. Failure to Warn
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot succeed on either failure to warn claim because there is no evidence it had notice of any nonobvious defect or danger. “Under Georgia law, a product seller has a duty to warn only of dangers that are either actually or constructively known to the seller at the time of sale.” Williams, 661 F. App'x at 721. If the seller had no notice of the danger at the time of sale or if the danger was “open and obvious” such that a “purchaser should recognize” it, the seller cannot be liable for failure to warn. Fletcher v. Water Applications Distrib. Grp., Inc., 773 S.E.2d 859, 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015); Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equip. Co., 605 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “A product seller is on notice of a danger if the seller has actual knowledge or should have reasonably foreseen a danger from the product.” Williams, 661 F. App'x at 721. Notice or knowledge of a danger can be shown by evidence of prior lawsuits, incidents, complaints or regulatory non-compliance. Id.
Here, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no evidence showing Defendant had notice or knowledge of any danger posed by the alarm. Plaintiff has failed to proffer evidence of prior lawsuits, incidents or complaints highlighting the Security Manager 2000's ability to cause hearing loss or tinnitus. There is also no evidence that the alarm failed to comply with any applicable regulations. On the contrary, Plaintiff concedes that his alarm did comply with local regulations as well as industry standards. Defendant has also proffered federal health and safety guidance from OSHA and NIOSH suggesting the alarm sounded at a reasonably safe volume for short-term exposure like Plaintiff experienced in this case.
Plaintiff nevertheless argues that constructive knowledge should be imputed onto Defendant because its 30(b)(6) representative, Tim Rader, stated that Defendant sometimes tests new products when it receives them from the manufacturer. The Court finds the argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the argument relies on facts that Plaintiff did not properly raise in a statement of additional facts. Thus, as explained above, the evidence is not properly before the Court under the Local Rules. Wills v. Polk County, No. 16-CV-47, 2017 WL 9439105, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ga. May 2, 2017). Second, even considering the argument, the statement does not show knowledge or notice of any danger. The cited portion of the deposition was a response to the following question: “Does [Defendant] do anything to make sure the manufacturer complied with [UL] industry standards?” [Doc. 33-1, p. 3] (emphasis added). It is apparent from the context that when Mr. Rader was discussing “testing,” he meant testing for UL compliance, not for the auditory health effects of alarm volume. Id. at 3–4. Specifically, the representative explained the “tests” of new products as follows:
At the time of production, we're testing the product to make sure it had met those certifications, the UL certifications, which has to be on the product. We visually inspect for that. And then we would do a – a set of tests to verify that the product does perform as we expect.
*6 Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not explain how such an inspection should have put Defendant on notice of any danger. Defendant simply reviewed products for compliance with industry standards. There is no evidence that any person was injured during the test or that any person was even near the alarm during the decibel assessment. Thus, even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds summary judgment is appropriate on the failure to warn claims because there is no evidence Defendant had knowledge or notice of any danger.6
II. Breach of Warranty
The Court now turns to Plaintiff's breach of warranty claim. Defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff abandoned this claim by failing to defend it in his response brief. At the summary judgment stage, “the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments,” and “grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.” Lawson v. ADT Sec. Servs., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1337–38 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (quoting Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)). As such, “[w]hen a non-moving party fails to address particular claims [raised] in the moving party's motion for summary judgment but responds to other arguments, the non-moving party abandons [those] claims.” Johns v. CSX Transp., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1373 (M.D. Ga. 2016); see also Clark v. City of Atlanta, 544 F. App'x 848, 855 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that the plaintiffs' state law causes of action were abandoned because the plaintiffs failed to defend the claims in their response to the motion for summary judgment).
Here, Plaintiff has plainly abandoned his breach of warranty claim. His response brief includes no analysis of any warranty under state law and fails to even mention the words “warranty,” “merchantability,” “fitness” or “particular purpose.” Given Defendant argued in its initial brief that Plaintiff could not show a breach of any warranty, the onus was on Plaintiff to raise arguments in defense of his claim. He failed to do so. Thus, the breach of warranty claim is properly deemed abandoned, and summary judgment on that claim is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 26] should be GRANTED. The Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions [Doc. 27] is DENIED as moot. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2025.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2025 WL 2795900
Footnotes
1
Plaintiff's response to these facts, and to several other facts, is “disputed as stated.” [Doc. 34, p. 1]. That is not a valid response under Local Rule 56.1. Casanova v. Pre Sols., Inc., No. 04-CV-2053, 2006 WL 5451193, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2006) (“Plaintiff's response of ‘Disputed as stated,’ without directly refuting a specific fact asserted by Defendants, does not comply with Local Rule 56.1B(2).”), aff'd, 228 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2007); accord Kharod v. City of Atlanta, No. 11-CV-1104, 2013 WL 11904720, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2013), R. & R. adopted, 2014 WL 11517843 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2014). Moreover, the statements are well supported by the record citations. [Doc. 37, pp. 1–2].
2
Defendant interprets Dr. Franks' opinion to mean that the alarm should have a maximum volume of 60 decibels. [Doc. 34, p. 10]. Plaintiff avers that the opinion should be read as recommending a 75-decibel maximum volume. Id. The Court finds Plaintiff's interpretation plausible and, given he is the non-movant, construes the quote in his favor.
3
Plaintiff objected to this fact, but his objection cites generally to the expert deposition transcripts without providing “specific citations to evidence (including page or paragraph number)” as required by the Local Rules. [Doc. 34, p. 7]; Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. Thus, the objection is invalid. Moreover, Plaintiff's citations do not refute Defendant's characterization, so this fact is deemed undisputed.
4
Plaintiff objects to this fact on the ground that there is no evidence that Defendant offered any warning to its customers. [Doc. 34, p. 7]. That contention is consistent with the fact stated, so the Court does not find that a genuine dispute exists regarding this fact.
5
The City of Marietta, where the incident occurred, has adopted the 2018 edition of the International Building Code with Georgia Amendments. [Doc. 34, p. 9].
6
Summary judgment is also appropriate as to the post-sale failure to warn claim because, unlike manufacturers, sellers do not have a duty to warn of defects learned after the time of sale. Fletcher, 773 S.E.2d at 866 (“The distributor of a product which, to its actual or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has a duty to give warning of such danger at the time of sale and delivery. Unlike a manufacturer, a seller or a distributor does not have a continuing duty to warn.”).
End of Document    © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Ken Kirschenbaum,Esq
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