Supreme Court, Nassau County, New York,
Special Term, Part I.
In the Matter of Philip J. LEVIEN et al., Petitioners,
v.
The BOARD OF ZONING AND APPEALS OF the INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF RUSSELL GARDENS
et al., Resp'ts.
Sept. 4, 1970.
 A motion was made to dismiss Article 78 proceeding relating to challenge to 
issuance of building permit.  The Supreme Court, Special Term, Bernard S. Meyer, 
J., held that where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be 
erected or altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that 
proposed building or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of 
Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that 
commercial building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning 
ordinance provision requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, 
which might be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to 
commercial building.
 Motion denied.
West Headnotes
[1] Certiorari  60
73k60 Most Cited Cases
[1] Certiorari  62
73k62 Most Cited Cases
In an Article 78 proceeding, respondent who has objection in point of law has 
option of raising it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it 
forth in answer, and when he seeks to have court pass upon not only his 
objections but also the merits of proceeding as disclosed by pleadings, papers 
and admissions, he has but to incorporate objections in his answer and court 
will, if it does not dismiss on the basis of objections, consider papers in same 
fashion as it would on motion for summary judgment and set matter for trial only 
if it concludes that there is a triable issue of fact.  CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 
7801 et seq., 7804(a, d, h).
[2] Certiorari  60
73k60 Most Cited Cases
In passing upon motion to dismiss Article 78 proceeding court considered only 
petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or might be 
judicially noticed where respondents' counsel misconceived applicability of 
summary judgment rule to an Article 78 proceeding and placed in supporting 
affidavits much of the pleading and evidence which should have gone into answer 
and return.  CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 7801 et seq.
[3] Zoning and Planning  441
414k441 Most Cited Cases
Where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be erected or 
altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that proposed building 
or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of Appeals had 
jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that commercial 
building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning ordinance provision 
requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, whose decision might 
be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to commercial 
buildings.  Village Law §  179-b;  CPLR 7801 et seq.
[4] Zoning and Planning  440.1
414k440.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 414k440)
Where village zoning ordinance made building inspector's approval of application 
or plan a condition precedent to consideration by board of trustees and board 
was required to issue permit if satisfied there was a full compliance with 
building code, trustees passed on compliance only with the building code which 
was wholly separate from zoning ordinance and their having done so did not 
relieve Board of Appeals of obligation of reviewing building inspector's 
determination that there was compliance with zoning ordinance.
[5] Zoning and Planning  442
414k442 Most Cited Cases
Allegations that petitioners inquired of village clerk for rules of Board of 
Appeals fixing time within which to appeal and were told that there were none 
and that the failure to file rules precluded board from relying thereon were 
sufficient, if proved, to raise question as to whether appeal from issuance of 
building permit was timely.
[6] Zoning and Planning  590
414k590 Most Cited Cases
Allegations of petitioners that they owned property immediately abutting 
property for which commercial building permit was issued sufficiently pleaded 
petitioners' right to maintain proceeding challenging issuance of permit. 
Village Law §  179-b;  CPLR 7804(f).
 **911 *41 Dreyer & Traub, New York City, for petitioners; by Samuel 
Kirschenbaum, New York City.
 Irving Levine, New York City, for respondents.
MEMORANDUM
 BERNARD S. MEYER, Justice.
 [1][2] The papers on this motion to dismiss an Article 78 proceeding are 
somewhat confused because respondents' counsel has misconceived the 
applicability to such a proceeding of CPLR 3211(c) and put into his supporting 
affidavits much of the pleading and evidence that should have gone into an 
answer and return.  An Article 78 proceeding is a special proceeding, CPLR 
7804(a), intended to be summarily decided 'upon the pleadings, papers and 
admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised,' CPLR 
409(b), and to be tried forthwith if a triable issue is raised, CPLR 7804(h).  A 
respondent who has an objection in point of law is given the option of raising 
it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it forth in his 
answer.  When he seeks to have the court pass not only upon his objections but 
also upon the merits of the proceeding as disclosed by the pleadings, papers and 
admissions, he has but to incorporate the objections in his answer, and the 
court will if it does not *42 dismiss on the basis of the objetions, then 
consider the papers, pursuant to CPLR 409(b), in the same fashion as it would on 
a motion for summary judgment, and will set the matter for trial only if it 
concludes that there is a triable issue of fact. To hold CPLR 3211(c) applicable 
and sanction the procedure here attempted by respondents would be to ignore the 
existence of CPLR 409(b) and to deprive petitioners of the right given them by 
CPLR 7804(d) to reply to new matter in the answer or dispute the accuracy of the 
return.  The court will, therefore, in passing upon the motion to dismiss 
consider only the petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or 
may be judicially noticed.
 On the basis of such consideration it is clear that the petition is sufficient, 
notwithstanding respondents' contentions that (1) a Board of Appeals has no 
jurisdiction to pass upon a permit issued by the Board of Trustees, (2) the 
appeal was not timely and (3) petitioners are not persons aggrieved.
 **912 [3] On the jurisdiction point respondents rely upon Matter of Katz v. 
Board of Appeals, 21 A.D.2d 693, 250 N.Y.S.2d 469, which held that a Village 
Board of Trustees is not an 'administrative official' within the meaning of 
Village Law s 179--b, and that its act in issuing a permit, though 
administrative in nature, could be reviewed only in an Article 78 proceeding.  
The record in that case shows that it involved a special exception permit, but 
it is not necessary to determine whether that is a sufficient basis to 
distinguish the present case, which concerns simply a building permit, for there 
is another basis for distinction.  The permit issued in the Katz case was issued 
by the Trustees pursuant to the Village Zoning Ordinance.  In the instant case 
Article VI, Section 10 of Ordinance No. 11 (Zoning Ordinance) of the Village of 
Russell Gardens provides that 'No building shall be erected or altered * * * 
until The Building Inspector shall issue a permit certifying that the proposed 
building or the proposed altered building and the use complies in every respect 
with this ordinance * * *' (emphasis supplied).  While Article III, Section 10 
of the Zoning Ordinance requires approval of a building permit by the Board of 
Trustees, its provisions are not applicable to a commercial building such as is 
the subject of the permit in this case.
 [4] Nor is the Board of Appeals deprived of jurisdiction to review the Building 
Inspector's determination under Article VI, Section 10 of the Zoning Ordinance 
by the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of Ordinance 15 (the Building Code).  
In the first place under the latter section of the Building Inspector's approval 
of the application or plan is a condition precedent to consideration by *43 the 
Board of Trustees and the Building Inspector must sign the permit.  More 
importantly, subd. 1 of Section 4 makes clear that if 'the Board of Trustees be 
satisfied that there is full compliance With the provisions of this Ordinance, 
the Board of Trustees Shall promptly Issue a permit therefor' (emphasis 
supplied).  Thus, the Trustees pass only upon compliance with the Building Code, 
an enactment wholly separate from the Zoning Ordinance, see Matter of Rosenstein 
v. Curran, 21 A.D.2d 802, 250 N.Y.S.2d 699; Matter of Village of Is. Park v. 
Bulk Plants, 258 App.Div. 185, 15 N.Y.S.2d 968; Matter of Cassety (Dobson), 255 
App.Div. 928, 8 N.Y.S.2d 740, and their having done so does not relieve the 
Board of Appeals of its obligation under Village Law s 179--b of reviewing the 
Building Inspector's determination that there was compliance with the Zoning 
Ordinance.  Paragraph 9 of the Petition pleads that the Building Inspector 
(erroneously designated Commissioner) in approving the plans acted contrary to 
the authority granted him and, thus, sufficiently raises the point.
 [5] The question of timeliness arises because the permit was issued March 17, 
1970 and the appeal was filed on May 27, 1970.  The petition alleges that the 
petitioners inquired of the Village Clerk for Rules of the Board of Appeals 
fixing the time to appeal and were told that **913 there were none (  10, 11) 
and that the failure to file Rules precludes respondents reliance upon them ( 
16).  Those allegations are sufficient, if proved, since Village Law s 179--b 
requires that every rule of the Board 'shall immediately be filed in the office 
of the board and with the Village Clerk and shall be a public record.' Moreover, 
the Board's decision, which is annexed as an exhibit to the petition, indicates 
that it computed the time to appeal from the issuance of the permit, whereas 
Matter of Pansa v. Damiano, 14 N.Y.2d 356, 251 N.Y.S.2d 665, 200 N.E.2d 563 and 
Matter of Highway Displays, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 32 A.D.2d 668, 300 
N.Y.S.2d 605, hold that the time to appeal of a property owner who has not 
received actual notice of the issuance of a permit runs not from the issuance of 
the permit but from the time he reasonably became chargeable with notice of its 
issuance, provided there has been no element of undue delay or laches.
 [6] On the issue of petitioners' standing to appeal, the petition ( 15) alleges 
that they own property immediately abutting the property for which the permit 
was issued.  Whatever the ultimate determination may be on the fact question 
whether petitioners' property was adversely affected, that allegation 
sufficiently pleads petitioners' right under the sixth unnumbered paragraph of 
Village Law s 179--b to maintain the proceeding.  Of course, in so ruling the 
court does not pass *44 upon whether the Board's finding that petitioners were 
not entitled to appeal, because not persons aggrieved within the meaning of the 
second unnumbered paragraph of the Section, was supported by substantial 
evidence, that not being an issue for consideration on this motion to dismiss.
 A short form order has accordingly been signed denying the motion and 
directingthat the matter proceed as in CPLR 7804(f) provided.  In reaching its 
decision the court has not considered the letter of August 7, 1970 from 
respondents' counsel or the letter of August 10, 1970 from petitioners' counsel, 
both of which were submitted without permission.
313 N.Y.S.2d 909, 64 Misc.2d 40
END OF DOCUMENT
Supreme Court, Nassau County, New York,Special Term, Part I.
In the Matter of Philip J. LEVIEN et al., Petitioners,v.The BOARD OF ZONING AND APPEALS OF the INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF RUSSELL GARDENSet al., Resp'ts.

Sept. 4, 1970.

 A motion was made to dismiss Article 78 proceeding relating to challenge to issuance of building permit.  The Supreme Court, Special Term, Bernard S. Meyer, J., held that where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be erected or altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that proposed building or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that commercial building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning ordinance provision requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, which might be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to commercial building.
 Motion denied.

West Headnotes
[1] Certiorari  6073k60 Most Cited Cases
[1] Certiorari  6273k62 Most Cited Cases
In an Article 78 proceeding, respondent who has objection in point of law has option of raising it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it forth in answer, and when he seeks to have court pass upon not only his objections but also the merits of proceeding as disclosed by pleadings, papers and admissions, he has but to incorporate objections in his answer and court will, if it does not dismiss on the basis of objections, consider papers in same fashion as it would on motion for summary judgment and set matter for trial only if it concludes that there is a triable issue of fact.  CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 7801 et seq., 7804(a, d, h).
[2] Certiorari  6073k60 Most Cited Cases
In passing upon motion to dismiss Article 78 proceeding court considered only petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or might be judicially noticed where respondents' counsel misconceived applicability of summary judgment rule to an Article 78 proceeding and placed in supporting affidavits much of the pleading and evidence which should have gone into answer and return.  CPLR 409(b), 3211(c), 7801 et seq.
[3] Zoning and Planning  441414k441 Most Cited Cases
Where village zoning ordinance provided that no building should be erected or altered until building inspector issued permit certifying that proposed building or altered building and use complied with ordinance, Board of Appeals had jurisdiction to pass on determination of building inspector that commercial building permit complied with zoning ordinance, since zoning ordinance provision requiring approval of building permit by board of trustees, whose decision might be reviewable only in Article 78 proceeding, was not applicable to commercial buildings.  Village Law §  179-b;  CPLR 7801 et seq.
[4] Zoning and Planning  440.1414k440.1 Most Cited Cases (Formerly 414k440)
Where village zoning ordinance made building inspector's approval of application or plan a condition precedent to consideration by board of trustees and board was required to issue permit if satisfied there was a full compliance with building code, trustees passed on compliance only with the building code which was wholly separate from zoning ordinance and their having done so did not relieve Board of Appeals of obligation of reviewing building inspector's determination that there was compliance with zoning ordinance.
[5] Zoning and Planning  442414k442 Most Cited Cases
Allegations that petitioners inquired of village clerk for rules of Board of Appeals fixing time within which to appeal and were told that there were none and that the failure to file rules precluded board from relying thereon were sufficient, if proved, to raise question as to whether appeal from issuance of building permit was timely.
[6] Zoning and Planning  590414k590 Most Cited Cases
Allegations of petitioners that they owned property immediately abutting property for which commercial building permit was issued sufficiently pleaded petitioners' right to maintain proceeding challenging issuance of permit. Village Law §  179-b;  CPLR 7804(f). **911 *41 Dreyer & Traub, New York City, for petitioners; by Samuel Kirschenbaum, New York City.
 Irving Levine, New York City, for respondents.

MEMORANDUM
 BERNARD S. MEYER, Justice.
 [1][2] The papers on this motion to dismiss an Article 78 proceeding are somewhat confused because respondents' counsel has misconceived the applicability to such a proceeding of CPLR 3211(c) and put into his supporting affidavits much of the pleading and evidence that should have gone into an answer and return.  An Article 78 proceeding is a special proceeding, CPLR 7804(a), intended to be summarily decided 'upon the pleadings, papers and admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised,' CPLR 409(b), and to be tried forthwith if a triable issue is raised, CPLR 7804(h).  A respondent who has an objection in point of law is given the option of raising it either by motion to dismiss before answer or by setting it forth in his answer.  When he seeks to have the court pass not only upon his objections but also upon the merits of the proceeding as disclosed by the pleadings, papers and admissions, he has but to incorporate the objections in his answer, and the court will if it does not *42 dismiss on the basis of the objetions, then consider the papers, pursuant to CPLR 409(b), in the same fashion as it would on a motion for summary judgment, and will set the matter for trial only if it concludes that there is a triable issue of fact. To hold CPLR 3211(c) applicable and sanction the procedure here attempted by respondents would be to ignore the existence of CPLR 409(b) and to deprive petitioners of the right given them by CPLR 7804(d) to reply to new matter in the answer or dispute the accuracy of the return.  The court will, therefore, in passing upon the motion to dismiss consider only the petition and exhibits annexed to it and matters which must or may be judicially noticed.
 On the basis of such consideration it is clear that the petition is sufficient, notwithstanding respondents' contentions that (1) a Board of Appeals has no jurisdiction to pass upon a permit issued by the Board of Trustees, (2) the appeal was not timely and (3) petitioners are not persons aggrieved.
 **912 [3] On the jurisdiction point respondents rely upon Matter of Katz v. Board of Appeals, 21 A.D.2d 693, 250 N.Y.S.2d 469, which held that a Village Board of Trustees is not an 'administrative official' within the meaning of Village Law s 179--b, and that its act in issuing a permit, though administrative in nature, could be reviewed only in an Article 78 proceeding.  The record in that case shows that it involved a special exception permit, but it is not necessary to determine whether that is a sufficient basis to distinguish the present case, which concerns simply a building permit, for there is another basis for distinction.  The permit issued in the Katz case was issued by the Trustees pursuant to the Village Zoning Ordinance.  In the instant case Article VI, Section 10 of Ordinance No. 11 (Zoning Ordinance) of the Village of Russell Gardens provides that 'No building shall be erected or altered * * * until The Building Inspector shall issue a permit certifying that the proposed building or the proposed altered building and the use complies in every respect with this ordinance * * *' (emphasis supplied).  While Article III, Section 10 of the Zoning Ordinance requires approval of a building permit by the Board of Trustees, its provisions are not applicable to a commercial building such as is the subject of the permit in this case.
 [4] Nor is the Board of Appeals deprived of jurisdiction to review the Building Inspector's determination under Article VI, Section 10 of the Zoning Ordinance by the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of Ordinance 15 (the Building Code).  In the first place under the latter section of the Building Inspector's approval of the application or plan is a condition precedent to consideration by *43 the Board of Trustees and the Building Inspector must sign the permit.  More importantly, subd. 1 of Section 4 makes clear that if 'the Board of Trustees be satisfied that there is full compliance With the provisions of this Ordinance, the Board of Trustees Shall promptly Issue a permit therefor' (emphasis supplied).  Thus, the Trustees pass only upon compliance with the Building Code, an enactment wholly separate from the Zoning Ordinance, see Matter of Rosenstein v. Curran, 21 A.D.2d 802, 250 N.Y.S.2d 699; Matter of Village of Is. Park v. Bulk Plants, 258 App.Div. 185, 15 N.Y.S.2d 968; Matter of Cassety (Dobson), 255 App.Div. 928, 8 N.Y.S.2d 740, and their having done so does not relieve the Board of Appeals of its obligation under Village Law s 179--b of reviewing the Building Inspector's determination that there was compliance with the Zoning Ordinance.  Paragraph 9 of the Petition pleads that the Building Inspector (erroneously designated Commissioner) in approving the plans acted contrary to the authority granted him and, thus, sufficiently raises the point.
 [5] The question of timeliness arises because the permit was issued March 17, 1970 and the appeal was filed on May 27, 1970.  The petition alleges that the petitioners inquired of the Village Clerk for Rules of the Board of Appeals fixing the time to appeal and were told that **913 there were none (  10, 11) and that the failure to file Rules precludes respondents reliance upon them ( 16).  Those allegations are sufficient, if proved, since Village Law s 179--b requires that every rule of the Board 'shall immediately be filed in the office of the board and with the Village Clerk and shall be a public record.' Moreover, the Board's decision, which is annexed as an exhibit to the petition, indicates that it computed the time to appeal from the issuance of the permit, whereas Matter of Pansa v. Damiano, 14 N.Y.2d 356, 251 N.Y.S.2d 665, 200 N.E.2d 563 and Matter of Highway Displays, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 32 A.D.2d 668, 300 N.Y.S.2d 605, hold that the time to appeal of a property owner who has not received actual notice of the issuance of a permit runs not from the issuance of the permit but from the time he reasonably became chargeable with notice of its issuance, provided there has been no element of undue delay or laches.
 [6] On the issue of petitioners' standing to appeal, the petition ( 15) alleges that they own property immediately abutting the property for which the permit was issued.  Whatever the ultimate determination may be on the fact question whether petitioners' property was adversely affected, that allegation sufficiently pleads petitioners' right under the sixth unnumbered paragraph of Village Law s 179--b to maintain the proceeding.  Of course, in so ruling the court does not pass *44 upon whether the Board's finding that petitioners were not entitled to appeal, because not persons aggrieved within the meaning of the second unnumbered paragraph of the Section, was supported by substantial evidence, that not being an issue for consideration on this motion to dismiss.
 A short form order has accordingly been signed denying the motion and directingthat the matter proceed as in CPLR 7804(f) provided.  In reaching its decision the court has not considered the letter of August 7, 1970 from respondents' counsel or the letter of August 10, 1970 from petitioners' counsel, both of which were submitted without permission.
313 N.Y.S.2d 909, 64 Misc.2d 40
END OF DOCUMENT