Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
ANSONIA ASSOCIATES LIMITED, etc., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
QUIK PARK ANSONIA GARAGE CORP., et al., Defendants-Respondents.
March 11, 1999.
 Judgment creditor brought action to enforce judgment obtained against insolvent 
subsidiary from parent corporation and its shareholder. The Supreme Court, New 
York County, Charles Ramos, J., granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
and judgment creditor appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held 
that: (1) creditor failed to make showing, as was required to disregard of 
corporate form, that parent corporation's domination and control over subsidiary 
was used for fraudulent ends and was cause of subsidiary's insolvency, and (2) 
creditor failed to establish claim that shareholder used debtor corporation for 
purely personal rather than corporate ends.
 Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Corporations  1.7(2)
101k1.7(2) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 101k1.6(3))
Although there was strong indicia of domination and control by parent 
corporation over judgment debtor, judgment creditor failed, despite substantial 
discovery in judgment debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, to make showing, as was 
required to disregard of corporate form, that such domination and control was 
used for fraudulent ends, and was cause of debtor's insolvency and its inability 
to pay rent due to judgment creditor.
[2] Corporations  1.7(2)
101k1.7(2) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 101k1.6(3))
Judgment creditor failed to establish claim that shareholder of parent 
corporation used debtor corporation for purely personal rather than corporate 
ends, as was required to hold shareholder liable for subsidiary's debt.
 **418 Dean G. Yuzek, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
 Samuel Kirschenbaum, for Defendants-Respondents.
 ELLERIN, P.J., NARDELLI, WILLIAMS and ANDRIAS, JJ.
 MEMORANDUM DECISION.
 *308 Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.), 
entered February 6, 1998, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
deemed to be an *309 appeal from the ensuing judgment, same court and Justice, 
entered February 13, 1998, which dismissed the complaint, and as so considered, 
the judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs.
 [1][2] Plaintiff is seeking to pierce the corporate veil to hold corporate 
defendants Quick Park Columbia Garage Corporation and Evan Garage Corporation 
and individual defendant Jacob Sopher liable for a $367,000 judgment obtained by 
plaintiff against the aforementioned corporate defendants' wholly owned and now 
insolvent subsidiary, defendant Quick Park Ansonia Garage Corporation.  While 
the record contains strong indicia of domination and control by the former 
corporate entities over the judgment debtor (see, Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. 
v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138;  Anderson Street Realty 
Corp. v. RHMB New Rochelle Leasing Corp., 243 A.D.2d 595, 663 N.Y.S.2d 279), 
plaintiff has failed, despite substantial discovery in the judgment debtor's 
bankruptcy proceeding, to make the **419 showing requisite to disregard of the 
corporate form that such domination and control as there was over the now 
insolvent corporation was used for fraudulent ends and, indeed, that it was the 
cause of the debtor's insolvency and, more specifically, of its inability to pay 
plaintiff rent.   In the absence of evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue 
of fact as to whether the corporate form was abused so as to cause plaintiff's 
injury, the action against the non-judgment debtor corporate defendants was 
properly dismissed (see, TNS Holdings, Inc v. MKI Securities Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 
335, 680 N.Y.S.2d 891, 703 N.E.2d 749;  Anderson Street Realty Corp. v. RHMB New 
Rochelle Leasing Corp., supra).   Plaintiff's action insofar as it was asserted 
against individual defendant Sopher was also properly dismissed since there is 
no evidence to support plaintiff's claim that Sopher used the debtor corporation 
for "purely personal rather than corporate ends" (Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 
N.Y.2d 414, 418, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6;  accord, Port Chester Elec. 
Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 656-657, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 357 N.E.2d 
983).
686 N.Y.S.2d 418, 259 A.D.2d 308, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 02041
END OF DOCUMENT
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
ANSONIA ASSOCIATES LIMITED, etc., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.QUIK PARK ANSONIA GARAGE CORP., et al., Defendants-Respondents.

March 11, 1999.

 Judgment creditor brought action to enforce judgment obtained against insolvent subsidiary from parent corporation and its shareholder. The Supreme Court, New York County, Charles Ramos, J., granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and judgment creditor appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that: (1) creditor failed to make showing, as was required to disregard of corporate form, that parent corporation's domination and control over subsidiary was used for fraudulent ends and was cause of subsidiary's insolvency, and (2) creditor failed to establish claim that shareholder used debtor corporation for purely personal rather than corporate ends.
 Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[1] Corporations  1.7(2)101k1.7(2) Most Cited Cases (Formerly 101k1.6(3))
Although there was strong indicia of domination and control by parent corporation over judgment debtor, judgment creditor failed, despite substantial discovery in judgment debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, to make showing, as was required to disregard of corporate form, that such domination and control was used for fraudulent ends, and was cause of debtor's insolvency and its inability to pay rent due to judgment creditor.
[2] Corporations  1.7(2)101k1.7(2) Most Cited Cases (Formerly 101k1.6(3))
Judgment creditor failed to establish claim that shareholder of parent corporation used debtor corporation for purely personal rather than corporate ends, as was required to hold shareholder liable for subsidiary's debt. **418 Dean G. Yuzek, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
 Samuel Kirschenbaum, for Defendants-Respondents.

 ELLERIN, P.J., NARDELLI, WILLIAMS and ANDRIAS, JJ.


 MEMORANDUM DECISION.
 *308 Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.), entered February 6, 1998, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, deemed to be an *309 appeal from the ensuing judgment, same court and Justice, entered February 13, 1998, which dismissed the complaint, and as so considered, the judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs.
 [1][2] Plaintiff is seeking to pierce the corporate veil to hold corporate defendants Quick Park Columbia Garage Corporation and Evan Garage Corporation and individual defendant Jacob Sopher liable for a $367,000 judgment obtained by plaintiff against the aforementioned corporate defendants' wholly owned and now insolvent subsidiary, defendant Quick Park Ansonia Garage Corporation.  While the record contains strong indicia of domination and control by the former corporate entities over the judgment debtor (see, Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138;  Anderson Street Realty Corp. v. RHMB New Rochelle Leasing Corp., 243 A.D.2d 595, 663 N.Y.S.2d 279), plaintiff has failed, despite substantial discovery in the judgment debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, to make the **419 showing requisite to disregard of the corporate form that such domination and control as there was over the now insolvent corporation was used for fraudulent ends and, indeed, that it was the cause of the debtor's insolvency and, more specifically, of its inability to pay plaintiff rent.   In the absence of evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the corporate form was abused so as to cause plaintiff's injury, the action against the non-judgment debtor corporate defendants was properly dismissed (see, TNS Holdings, Inc v. MKI Securities Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 335, 680 N.Y.S.2d 891, 703 N.E.2d 749;  Anderson Street Realty Corp. v. RHMB New Rochelle Leasing Corp., supra).   Plaintiff's action insofar as it was asserted against individual defendant Sopher was also properly dismissed since there is no evidence to support plaintiff's claim that Sopher used the debtor corporation for "purely personal rather than corporate ends" (Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6;  accord, Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 656-657, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 357 N.E.2d 983).
686 N.Y.S.2d 418, 259 A.D.2d 308, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 02041
END OF DOCUMENT